LAWYERS' PRACTICE AND IDEALS
A COMPARATIVE VIEW

Chapter Five
REMAPPING LAWYERS' TURF: A COMMENT ON PROFESSORS CLARK AND MATTEI

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KLUWER LAW INTERNATIONAL

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Professors Clark and Mattei draw our attention to two central features concerning lawyers and legal professions, namely, organization and culture. These features are interrelated in both domestic and transnational settings. That is, the context in which the professions operate affects their realization, and the function of the professions affects their context. The dynamism of this relationship negates a simple deterministic, one-way relationship. Professions are not mere cultural artifacts manufactured by civil society for the maintenance of order.[1] Professor Clark clearly highlights the fact that lawyers are found in all societies, from state centered, to socialist, to free market. Lawyers have often played revolutionary as well as evolutionary roles, as they have in the United States. Therefore, lawyers are a key component in handling the range of law jobs available in society.[2] How they organize, reproduce themselves, and carry out their roles is of crucial im-

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[1]Talcott Parsons, *The Professions and Social Structure,* 17 SOC. FORCES 457 (1951).
[2]WILLIAM L. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973).

portance to us. Professor Mattei attunes us to the contingency of the market, especially in the ways firms handle questions of transaction costs.

The sociology of the professions has in the main concentrated on control, especially the control of supply of producers[3] and the control professionals exercise over clients.[4] We know that professions are not monolithic entities, even though collectively they may pursue professional projects[5] and that they engage in intraprofessional struggles as well as interprofessional ones. One other aspect of the sociology of the legal profession is that most attention has been given to the macro-structure of the profession — organization, size, remuneration, and so on. To come to grips with lawyers' practice, as suggested in the symposium title, however, I argue that we must attempt to integrate both macro and micro features of research concerning the legal profession. Only then can we begin to understand this strange creature, the lawyer, who adopts so many different guises. Let me quote the example of a young English solicitor who, during a seminar on multidisciplinary practice, announced, "I joined a law firm because I wanted to be in the City [of London] and didn't want to join a bank. I'm not really interested in being a lawyer." Professor Clark alludes to this philosophy when he characterizes the difficulties of definition and application of the term *lawyer*.[6] Lawyers are complex beings who cross disciplinary boundaries to become investment bankers, civil servants, accountants, politicians, and so on, as well as acting as lawyers in the sense of dealing with law.

Two kinds of specialization exist. The first is a stratification into various divisions, such as judge, *avocat, avoué,* notary, or solicitor, all of which have their own modes of entry. The second concerns the type of internal labor markets that are established as a result of cultural associations with varieties of work; here I refer to categories of legal work such as corporate, personal injury, mergers and acquisitions, and medical negligence. These divisions relieve us, as Professor Mattei indicates, of the anxieties associated

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[3]Ernest Greenwood, *Attributes of a Profession,* 2 SOC. WORK, July 1957, at 45 (1957); MAGALI S. LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1977); RICHARD L. ABEL, THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN ENGLAND AND WALES (1988).

[4]TERENCE J. JOHNSON, PROFESSIONS AND POWER (1972); JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (1982).

[5]ANDREW D. ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF EXPERT LABOR (1988).

[6]Professor David S. Clark, *Comparing the Work and Organization of Lawyers Worldwide: The Persistence of Legal Traditions,* in this volume, page 9.

with the problem of the convergence or otherwise of the civil and common law professions.[7] At the same time, they enable us to deal with the processes of globalization and multinational and multidisciplinary practice. The market for legal and other professional services is becoming so segmented that conventional typologies cannot encapsulate this complexity in a meaningful way. Even the traditional civilizing role ascribed to professionals[8] is threatened by these processes. Lawyers debate whether they belong to businesses predicated on corporate values and strategies or are part of the liberal professions with a sense of vocation dedicated to the good of the public.[9] Even the concept of belonging to a particular jurisdiction is controversial as, for example, lawyers become international lawyers prepared to do business anywhere with any kind of law. One international business lawyer remarked that the key elements required for his job were a fluency in English, regardless of one's native tongue, an ability to draft contracts in the discursive Anglo-American style rather than the succinct continental style, and an understanding of privatized dispute resolution systems such as arbitration.[10] In the late 1970s, English City solicitors described their role to a British royal commission as "marketing a product called English law."[11] These examples express a pragmatic approach to law and its professions.

Many techniques are used to study the modern legal profession, from statistical analysis,[12] through oral history and biography,[13] to the qualitative techniques of in-depth interviewing and ethnography.[14] Professor Clark

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[7]Professor Ugo A. Mattei, *The Legal Profession as an Organization: Understanding Changes in Common Law and Civil Law,* in this volume, page 157.

[8]*See* Parsons, *supra* note 1.

[9]AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ". . . IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE": A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM (1986).

[10]John Flood, *Megalawyering in the Global Order: The Cultural, Social and Economic Transformation of Global Legal Practice,* 3 INT'L J. LEGAL PROF. 169, 190 (1996).

[11]John Flood, *Megalaw in the UK: Professionalism or Corporatism? A Preliminary Report,* 64 IND. L.J. 569 (1989).

[12]*E.g.,* HEINZ & LAUMANN, *supra* note 4.

[13]*E.g.* MICHAEL J. KELLY, LIVES OF LAWYERS: JOURNEYS IN THE ORGANIZATIONS OF PRACTICE (1994).

[14]*E.g.,* JOHN FLOOD, BARRISTERS' CLERKS: THE LAW'S MIDDLEMEN (1983); KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATTORNEYS AT WORK (1985); YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1996).

relies more on the former techniques gathered from a wide-ranging set of countries. Cross-country comparisons are problematic,[15] but, within his theoretical structure, he deploys the figures gracefully through space and time. Although analysis of this type, primarily etic, grants breadth and scope to the subject, it veers away from depth and veils the emic aspect. Conversely, Professor Mattei eschews breadth for a more concentrated target on the split between unitary and divided professions in four countries: the United States, England and Wales, Germany, and France. His analytical tool encapsulates the anthropological ideal of making strange that which is familiar and how, borrowing from neo-institutional economics,[16] organizations (i.e., legal professions) adapt to institutional settings, especially markets.[17] I would like to supplement both Professors Clark's and Mattei's economic readings of the markets for lawyers by adopting a somewhat different sociological framework.

Whereas there has been an enormous growth in the use of economic theory in law and law-related areas such as antitrust, it has often been at the expense of the richness and diversity of the sociality of life. Social relations construct the operation of markets in subtle ways. If we consider the futures markets in Chicago, for example, we would expect, on the basis of economic theory, to find something approaching perfect competition in the pits on the trading floor. It isn't so. Traders form alliances, cliques, cabals, and so forth.[18] Information is traded as much as the contracts themselves. It is not unlike the operation of the souk.[19] A situation that is apparently boundless instead creates its own boundaries by constraining action on the basis of preferences that are essentially irrational. If markets are social constructs, then how do they function? I must explain my approach. One problem with studies of the legal profession has been their division between

[15]*See* MATTEI DOGAN & DOMINIQUE PELASSY, HOW TO COMPARE NATIONS: STRATEGIES IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS (1984).

[16]OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975). *Cf.* Walter F. Powell, *Neither Market Nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization*, 12 RES. IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 295 (1990).

[17]Mattei, *The Legan Profession as an Organization*, *supra* note 7.

[18]*E.g.*, Wayne E. Baker, *Floor Trading and Crowd Dynamics*, *in* THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 107 (Patricia A. Adler & Peter Adler eds., 1983).

[19]*E.g.*, Clifford Geertz, *Suq: The Bazaar Economy in Sefrou*, *in* MEANING AND ORDER IN MOROCCAN SOCIETY: THREE ESSAYS IN CULTURAL ANALYSIS 123 (Clifford Geertz et al. eds., 1979).

studies of the structure of the profession and studies of a more micro nature. I recently undertook a research project for the Lord Chancellor's Advisory Committee on Legal Education and Conduct.[20] The substance of the research was the changing market for advocacy for solicitors who had been given rights of audience in the higher courts. There was a fear that barristers would suffer with such direct competition and the bar was in danger of withering away.

I think this study is relevant here for two reasons: one is that Professors Clark and Mattei implicitly assume that litigation is the core work of lawyers, and the second is that we were able to begin to study the legal profession in a way that was sensitive to both structure and agency. Litigation is probably one of the defining characteristics of the legal profession,[21] and it is one that is struggled over and occasionally protected. Professor Mattei suggests that in the United Kingdom, the division between solicitors and barristers is functional. Certainly, if we investigate the history of these groups it is clear that before the nineteenth century they performed tasks over which no group had a monopoly such as conveyancing. In the nineteenth century the bar and solicitors carved up the legal terrain between them. Their trick was to make the division appear as though it had been that way since time immemorial (circa 1189). With the changes in the rights of audience we no longer have that "functional" division. We do have a division of expertise, but it will not necessarily always be along advocacy/office lines. And this has to do with the nature of markets, to which I have already hinted.

Rather than assuming that markets are places of activity populated merely by producers and consumers (although of course to an extent they are), it is preferable to ask questions not normally broached by economists. One is, "Why, when even the largest of firms wants to offer a product new to it to the public, does it usually do so by acquiring the persona of a firm

[20]JOHN FLOOD ET AL., RECONFIGURING THE MARKET FOR ADVOCACY SERVICES: A CASE STUDY OF LONDON AND FOUR FIELDS OF PRACTICE (1996) (Report for the Lord Chancellor's Advisory Committee on Legal Education and Conduct).

[21]William H. Simon, *The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics*, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29; JOHN MORISON & PHILIP LEITH, THE BARRISTER'S WORLD AND THE NATURE OF LAW (1992). *Cf.* Ian M. Ramsay, *What Do Lawyers Do? Reflections on the Market for Lawyers*, 21 INT'L J. SOC. L. 355 (1993).

belonging to an existing market?"[22] We see some indication of this in the burgeoning market for advocacy services provided by solicitors. In some respects solicitor-advocates want to be like barristers, while in others they claim a difference which says, in effect, that besides being advocates we are also solicitors. It is possible to behold solicitors and barristers as firms in the advocacy market. White's sociological view of markets sees them as "self-reproducing social structures among specific cliques of firms . . . who evolve roles from observations of each other's behavior. I insist that what a firm does in a market is to watch the competition in terms of observables."[23]

Clearly, advocacy lends itself to "observables" superbly in that it is an activity that is often observed in the public domain. Producers have to anticipate the optimal volume of services in the market, which is extremely hard to fathom because all such information will be imperfect, since feedback systems are inherently deficient. Producers must search diligently for information, for, according to White,

> Obtaining . . . information requires alert inquiry — over luncheons with others in the trade, from trade associations, from one's own customers, and so on. Each firm knows that its product is distinctive, but it also knows the difficulty and risk of assessing one's own distinctiveness. . . . In particular, when the total volume one offers in the market changes, its attractiveness to buyers changes, in ways hard to estimate. No firm can reliably assess relative qualities of other firms, and every firm knows that its position could be affected by choices made by any one or more of its competitors.[24]

If we substitute solicitors and barristers for producers, we can describe some of the situations occurring in the advocacy market. Much of it is imponderable for producers: if solicitors begin to offer large-scale advocacy services, how will buyers react?

In this study four fields of practice were surveyed through interviews with practitioners in each, namely, corporate, personal injury, criminal defense, and immigration. These fields map onto the hemispheres of practice outlined by Heinz and Laumann, and they represent established and devel-

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[22]Harrison C. White, *Where Do Markets Come From?*, 87 AM. J. SOC. 517, 517–18 (1981). One sees these activities among large corporations, e.g., Coca Cola and Pepsi Cola, and Evian and Vittel.

[23]*Id.* at 518.

[24]*Id.* at 519.

oping areas of practice.[25] They employ a variety of arenas for dispute resolution, from tribunals through arbitration to all levels of courts. All are subject to external influences such as developments in European law and lex mercatoria. Each field varied according to its own cultural factors. I will outline two fields to illustrate my thesis.

The corporate field was the most entrepreneurial and flexible in approach to its work. Large solicitors' firms want to enter the advocacy market, and some have set up advocacy departments. Barristers in the field realize that their monopoly of advocacy is over and are prepared to work with solicitor-advocates (e.g., a Queen's Counsel with a solicitor-advocate junior). More important, they realize that they are no longer the leaders in the management of the case, a role that has been taken over by solicitors. Barristers understand the flux of their role in the legal profession, as a leading corporate queen's counsel admitted: "We've had a glorious, unprecedented fifteen years [1982–97] . . . which was based . . . upon a boom in litigation and more and more people wanting to try litigation, that is clients, and therefore the people involved in it make more money, but I can't believe it will go on forever." The problem that solicitor-advocates face, however, is how to cope with the constant flow of clients' demands; they are yet to erect protective barriers such as are available to barristers in their chambers (i.e., no or little direct contact with lay clients). Entrepreneurialism is growing, including arrangements between some sets of chambers and certain solicitors' firms whereby all advocacy work tendered to these chambers is done at a discounted rate.

Personal injury is a closed field by comparison with corporate. Its members — solicitors and barristers alike — have entrenched views on the ways business should be conducted. The following quotation from a personal injury solicitor illustrates the tenor of these feelings: "[Solicitors'] training is forensic investigation, analysis of legal risk, manipulation of clients on a day to day basis, assessment of values, investigation into liability, presentation of papers, not standing on their feet and arguing points at an actual trial and not cross-examining witnesses in a box. I'm not saying they aren't capable, but I am saying that at some point in time they looked at the system when they were training and they made a decision over what they wanted to do and they decided that they didn't want to stand up on their feet in court and present a case to a judge. They decided, I hope they

[25]HEINZ & LAUMANN, *supra* note 4, ch. 2.

are working in the right job, that they wanted to do the work solicitors do." Barristers are unwilling to work alongside solicitor-advocates, and even judges have been known to make disparaging remarks about them (e.g., the "wig wars"[26]). The key reason for solicitors' reluctance to enter the advocacy market is that the bar is considerably cheaper than they are. Underlying this aversion to change is a culture that is steeped in traditionalism, which, ultimately, will alter but will take considerable time to do so unless forced by the state through changes in legal aid.[27]

Advocacy is probably the last of the trinity of tasks — drafting, advising, advocacy — traditionally ascribed to lawyers to be demystified. And one can argue that the locus of lawyers' work has shifted to the other two tasks. Only a tiny minority of disputes ends up in court, and many people and businesses go to lawyers for advice on deals — facilitative rather than remedial. If this shift is occurring, then the bar, which has often considered itself akin to priesthood,[28] is in danger of being superseded as psychiatry has done with the clergy. The result is not, however, a takeover of the bar by solicitors.

The market for advocacy services is not single or homogeneous. It is complex, differentiated, and culturally impregnated. That is, there are a series of markets, each with its own features and culture. As Bourdieu clearly states, a field, and that includes advocacy services, is "a structured space of social forces and struggles."[29] Solicitors, barristers, and others are now engaging in a struggle either to legitimate tradition or to be iconoclastic. Each group is mustering a portfolio of resources, i.e., symbolic capital, to engage in these jurisdictional battles.[30] Their success depends both on the technical and ideological elements in their portfolios.[31] These battles, however, are

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[26]The dispute arose over whether solicitor-advocates could wear wigs, as barristers do, in court. The Lord Chancellor, after lobbying from the bar, decided solicitors could wear gowns but not wigs thereby stigmatizing them. *See* FLOOD ET AL., *supra* note 20.

[27]LORD CHANCELLOR'S DEPARTMENT, LEGAL AID — TARGETING NEED (1995); LORD WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: FINAL REPORT (1996).

[28]BARNETT HOLLANDER, THE ENGLISH BAR, A PRIESTHOOD: THE TRIBUTE OF AN AMERICAN LAWYER (1964).

[29]PIERRE BOURDIEU & LOIC J. D. WACQUANT, AN INVITATION TO REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY 243 (1992).

[30]ABBOTT, *supra* note 5.

[31]H. Jamous & B. Peloille, *Professions or Self-Perpetuating Systems? Changes in the French University-Hospital System*, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONALIZATION 109 (John A. Jackson ed., 1970).

complicated by intraprofessional struggles. The fields mentioned above — corporate, personal injury, immigration, and criminal defense — are distinct, and the practitioners in them are aware of their differences from each other. Yet the four fields are overlapping, nested subcultures, and there is no institution-wide consensus.[32] This situation will create difficulties for the solicitors' and barristers' professional bodies in coping with the strains induced by the changes because they will be pulled in more than one direction, with little hope of creating consensus. Change will be slow because of resistance from the older members of the professions and may take at least a generation to work through.

How are we to appreciate the effects of these changes? I attempt here to synthesize some of the findings and speculate about possible futures. Some of the fears expressed, for example, concerned the dangers of barristers being poached into the big law firms, the bar withering away, and even fusion occurring. We argue that these fears are misplaced. They rely on outdated and simplistic understandings of the machinations of markets and professional jurisdictions. If the members of the different groups are allowed to engage in the full array of activities open to lawyers — advocacy, deal making, advising, conflict resolution — the drive to fusion, for example, evaporates. Once the barriers to specific activities are removed, all that remains is specialization, to an infinite degree. Nomenclature is virtually redundant. Examples of such divisions of labor are found in the United States, Canada, and Australia, where one can be an attorney, barrister, solicitor, or all three. And recently France enacted a law bringing every member of the legal profession under the umbrella of the *avocat*, although legal practice has continued much as before, when there were several groups, including *conseils juridiques* and *avocats*. The extension of the rights of audience is one of the major steps on the road to full competition among all members of the legal profession. But again we tread on dangerous ground because we talk of the legal profession as though it were a mass. It is not. Let me suggest here a possible theory of practice.

The four fields of practice are different. Rather than letting that difference stand as an obstacle to further analysis, we must embrace it. We attempt to offer a model that will enable further, deeper analysis in this area. To offer a theoretical formulation means we adopt the axiom of parsimony,

[32]Joanne Martin and Debra Meyerson, *Organizational Cultures and the Denial, Channelling and Acknowledgement of Ambiguity*, in MANAGING AMBIGUITY AND CHANGE 93 (Louis R. Pondy et al. eds., 1988).

and so our model will omit many of the rich details found in this study.[33] But Weber argues that the use of ideal types was a crucial means of coming to grips with realities of everyday life.[34] Our research related the field of practice to its type. Each of these is further subdivided into inclusive/exclusive (field) and open/closed (type). Figure 1 arranges these pictorially.

The 2 x 2–cell structure captures the essence of the model, which can be explained as follows. The fields of practice fall into two types, "open" and "closed." These types refer to the responsiveness of the members of the field to change. The corporate field is recognizably market-driven and therefore must be adaptable to change or producers risk losing work to other suppliers, especially in international markets. It cannot risk being closed to exogenous forces. Consumers in the corporate field are usually privately financed rather than being supported by the state. In the field of immigration the situation is different, but there are a few similarities. The immigration field has always been open because government and others have resisted regulating it. Entry to potential producers has been free so that "cowboy consultants" have become active in the field.[35] Furthermore, immigration, because much of its work is done in tribunals, is a field ineligible for legal aid. This is a crucial structural variable in the analysis.

Personal injury and criminal defense are closed fields, where the work is often high-volume with well-established routines for processing it. Both have extensive work traditions with entrenched values. Our study found that these fields were the most impervious to change; they have much invested in the status quo. Criminal defense lawyers had a strong fear of the Crown Prosecution Service being admitted and swamping the field.[36] Per-

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[33]ARTHUR L. STINCHCOMBE, CONSTRUCTING SOCIAL THEORIES (1968).

[34]MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978).

[35]These consultants are often former Home Office civil servants who have dealt with immigration matters. They have a bad reputation for abandoning their "clients" once their cases reach the immigration tribunals. The majority of immigration tribunal cases are handled by charitable agencies working in the field. *See* FLOOD ET AL., *supra* note 20.

[36]The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) is a publicly funded agency assigned the task of deciding whether prosecutions should be brought and administering the cases. The lawyers who belong to the CPS do not have rights of audience in the higher courts, therefore they must retain barristers to present their cases in court. The CPS is under the jurisdiction of the director of public prosecutions and the attorney general. The government has, however, proposed that all employed advocates, who don't generally have rights of audience and include the CPS, should in future have full rights of audience

FIGURE 1: A MODEL OF FIELDS OF PRACTICE

TYPE	FIELD: INCLUSIVE	FIELD: EXCLUSIVE
OPEN	CORPORATE	IMMIGRATION
CLOSED	PERSONAL INJURY	CRIMINAL DEFENSE

sonal injury lawyers worried about the insurance companies taking more proactive roles in the handling of cases. Entry to these two fields is more difficult because of the role of external sources of funding. Both are dependent on funding from state sources, that is, legal aid, and, in personal injury, the backing of labor unions. Long-established members of the fields can tap into these sources more effectively than newcomers, especially now that the funders are imposing more burdensome conditions on the obtaining of, and accounting for, these funds through franchising and other means. Conditions are made harder by funders' moves to control the growth in funds. For example, restricting access is reducing legal aid by consumers through income and capital limits, and labor unions are perturbed about shrinking membership and its impact on expenditures.[37]

The other two variables, inclusive and exclusive, refer to the jurisdictional subject matters of the fields. The immigration field deals almost exclusively with outsiders, those stigmatized by being given alien status. These are the dispossessed. They have virtually no rights, as is illustrated by the recent changes in immigration law, which have attempted to speed up the disposition of deportation cases. This situation provides fertile conditions for opening the immigration field because its consumers are powerless to resist

under clause 31A. (3) (a) of the Access to Justice Bill (H. L.), introduced in the House of Lords, December 2, 1998 (http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199899/ cmbills/067/1999067.htm, at sections 32-38).

[37] *Blair's Brothers*, ECONOMIST, Sept. 7, 1996, at 19.

the imposition of state and professional norms. They are classic one-shot players. Those members of the field who claim elite status make those claims, not so much on the qualities of the field itself but rather its proximity to more mainstream fields such as judicial review. In this way they can be active in the field but not necessarily be counted as of the field. Criminal defense, too, engages with deviants, another form of dispossessed, but at least they have legitimate rights based on tenets of citizenship, denied to those in the immigration field. Its practitioners are able to transform their status depending on the type of criminal, for example, city financial criminal, major gangland criminal, or street drug dealer. Essentially, however, the consumers have self-selected themselves into deviant categories and therefore are generally excluded.

The corporate field is the opposite. Its consumers are archetypal repeat players, in full possession of a capacious portfolio of resources and knowledge that enables them to exercise considerable control over the structuring of the field. Consumer elites are serviced by professional elites who share similar values and status. Finally, in the personal injury field, where one might think the consumers were outsiders, they are brought under the inclusive category because of the nature of fault ascription in the field. Accident victims are generally held to be without fault; they are victims rather than perpetrators, as in the criminal field. The producers are either allied with major institutions such as insurance companies or take on a missionary role claiming justice for their clients. But here the ideal is to restore the victims to some prior appropriate state, as with the corporate field, where there is a desire to add value to members. In the cases of the criminal and immigration fields the purpose is to excise the bad and remove the alien.

This model is important in understanding the market because it explains, in part, why there is resistance to offering advocacy services. It is a preliminary attempt at modeling the four fields of practice using the minimum of variables so that its use can eventually be extended to other fields. Ultimately, we will need a combination of methods — economic and sociological — that will enable us to make sense of these many changes. Specialization, especially, is flourishing, as formal labels mean less and less. In this respect I think Professor Mattei and I arrive at similar conclusions.